AI Coordination Opportunities A plan inferred for the September 24, 2026 meeting between President Trump and President Xi Jinping, in which artificial intelligence is expected to be a principal topic of discussion. This plan has been inferred and has no official status. ^^ As of this rendition, no joint communique, agenda, or strategic plan had been published by either government for the September 24, 2026 meeting. Goals and Objectives here are derived conservatively from public statements reported by Fox News and Reuters (July 23, 2026), including President Trump's remarks characterizing artificial intelligence as a race in which "whoever wins...is probably going to win, period," and Secretary of State Marco Rubio's characterization of preparatory talks with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi as laying groundwork for a "very positive visit." https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-says-chinese-president-xi-jinping-visit-us-sept-24 ^^ The plan intentionally separates cooperative and competitive strands of the relationship rather than assuming either framing exclusively, and is designed to support later Relationship elements, in StratML Part 2 format, connecting it to the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO) plan and to the National Public-private Framework for AI (NPFAI), the President's AI Council (PAIC), the America's AI Action Plan (AAIAP), the America's AI Exports (AAIE), and Executive Order 14179. ^^ Submitter's Note: This plan has been inferred and rendered in StratML format in dialog with Claude.ai. It has been editing in the form at https://stratml.us/forms/Claude/Part1.html. United States-China AI Summit USCAIS bc977ec9-6b85-4208-8982-a5e20a70a64e A bilateral meeting between the governments of the United States and the People's Republic of China, announced for September 24, 2026, at which artificial intelligence is expected to be a principal topic. Government of the United States Represented at the summit by President Donald Trump, who has characterized artificial intelligence leadership as a race the United States intends to win. Government of the People's Republic of China Represented at the summit by President Xi Jinping, who agreed to the visit during President Trump's earlier trip to Beijing. Marco Rubio U.S. Secretary of State, who spoke with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to lay groundwork for the visit. Wang Yi Chinese Foreign Minister, who spoke with Secretary of State Marco Rubio regarding preparations for the visit. Global AI Governance Community Intergovernmental organizations, standards bodies, and civil-society stakeholders with an interest in the cooperative or competitive direction the two governments take on artificial intelligence. A relationship between the United States and China in which shared risks from artificial intelligence are managed jointly even where broader strategic aims remain in competition. 309958ce-8ce9-4968-9993-2d09e3d5c14f To use the September 24, 2026 meeting to identify specific artificial intelligence objectives the two governments can pursue jointly, while candidly acknowledging the objectives on which they will continue to compete. 3c80b85e-8ce3-4a9f-8a3c-1052396bbb29 Reciprocity Pursue arrangements in which obligations and benefits are balanced between the two governments, rather than concessions running in one direction only. Transparency Favor open, published statements of intentions, activities, and results over ambiguity, even where the two governments continue to disagree. Shared Risk Awareness Recognize that certain artificial intelligence risks, such as safety failures or unintended escalation, threaten both nations regardless of which is otherwise ahead in capability. Restraint Avoid actions, particularly involving military or autonomous systems, that could turn artificial intelligence competition into armed conflict or crisis escalation. Sovereignty Respect each government's independent authority to pursue its own artificial intelligence capability, infrastructure, and security policy. Pragmatism Prioritize concrete, verifiable outcomes over rhetorical framing, whether cooperative or competitive. Risk Reduce the shared risk of unintended harm or escalation arising from artificial intelligence systems, independent of broader strategic competition. 306d9d09-1833-4032-b5cd-236c6539e10a 1 Risk Management Cooperation ~ Strategic rivals have historically found it possible to cooperate on shared risks even amid broader competition, as with Cold War-era nuclear hotlines and arms-control verification regimes. Because uncontrolled artificial intelligence risk, such as a safety failure or an autonomous-system malfunction, would harm both nations regardless of which is otherwise ahead in capability, this Goal treats risk management as a domain where joint action serves each government's own interest independent of the broader competitive relationship. Safety Establish a bilateral channel through which each government can notify the other of significant artificial intelligence safety incidents. 9a5041b5-1576-440c-8b25-62a9d9f7243c 1.1 Safety Incident Communication ~ A dedicated bilateral notification channel, modeled on existing nuclear and military incident-communication mechanisms, would allow either government to alert the other promptly when a domestic artificial intelligence system produces unintended or dangerous behavior, reducing the chance that a unilateral incident is misread as a hostile act. Escalations Establish protocols reducing the likelihood that artificial intelligence-enabled military or autonomous systems trigger unintended escalation. c6229569-7b0e-48b4-92cb-8a374ed10a10 1.2 Escalation Prevention ~ As artificial intelligence becomes more integrated into military decision support, early-warning, and autonomous systems, the two governments share an interest in protocols, such as agreed human-in-the-loop requirements or advance notice of relevant exercises, that prevent an artificial intelligence-related malfunction or misinterpretation from triggering unintended military escalation. Assessments Encourage periodic joint or parallel assessment of frontier artificial intelligence capabilities that could pose shared risks. 5443abda-a39b-452d-a1fb-cd0041b3cf25 1.3 Joint Risk Assessment ~ Because frontier artificial intelligence capabilities can advance rapidly and unpredictably, periodic joint or parallel technical assessments, even if conducted separately and compared only at a high level, would give each government earlier visibility into risks such as loss of control or dangerous capability thresholds that neither side can fully anticipate alone. Standards & Interoperability Sustain technical cooperation on artificial intelligence standards and interoperability notwithstanding broader strategic competition. b8283f90-1aa3-4065-87f7-886b69c34074 2 Standards Coordination ~ Even amid political and economic rivalry, China has continued to participate in international standards bodies such as ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 42. Both governments have an interest in artificial intelligence systems and infrastructure that interoperate safely and predictably across borders, since standards-setting shapes global technical rules regardless of which nation is otherwise ahead. Standards Bodies Continue participation by both governments in international standards bodies addressing artificial intelligence, including ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 42. 67d33c83-8fde-4e9e-b124-d90f50a1a091 2.1 Standards Body Engagement ~ Sustained participation by both countries in bodies such as ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 42, the OECD, and relevant W3C community groups helps ensure emerging artificial intelligence standards reflect input from both governments, rather than being set unilaterally by one side or fragmenting into incompatible regional regimes. Interoperability Preserve technical interoperability of artificial intelligence infrastructure and protocols supporting safe international use. e2db5a81-9a0f-4006-83a0-05d7299b7491 2.2 Technical Compatibility ~ Shared technical protocols, for example in artificial intelligence safety testing, incident classification, or model documentation, reduce friction in cross-border artificial intelligence-enabled commerce and research and lower the risk that incompatible national approaches to safety and security create unnecessary points of conflict. Understanding Build sufficient mutual understanding between the two governments to support constructive leader-level dialogue on artificial intelligence. 2f3cd32f-a8d7-4d0b-92ea-3259c67b69e8 3 Diplomatic Groundwork ~ Leader-level summits typically depend on lower-visibility preparatory diplomacy to succeed. The July 2026 Rubio-Wang Yi call, described as laying groundwork for a "very positive visit," illustrates how working-level channels can pursue constructive, cooperative aims even when public rhetoric from national leaders is framed competitively. Consultations Conduct preparatory diplomatic consultations, such as the Rubio-Wang Yi call, to lay groundwork for a constructive leader-level meeting. 1dff56f1-ce1a-47e2-8a5a-c3740df21c9b 3.1 Preparatory Consultations ~ Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi's July 2026 call to lay groundwork for the visit reflects the pattern by which substantive bilateral progress is often negotiated in advance of a summit rather than improvised at the leader level. Dialogue Conduct direct dialogue between President Trump and President Xi Jinping addressing artificial intelligence among other bilateral topics. e6e1ed77-01aa-406b-abb3-5df9c59148fa 3.2 Leader-Level Dialogue ~ President Trump extended the invitation to President Xi Jinping during his own visit to Beijing earlier in 2026. The September 24 meeting represents the follow-through on that invitation and the venue at which any preparatory agreements would be confirmed or announced publicly. Objectives Advance each government's independent artificial intelligence leadership objectives, recognizing that these objectives are pursued in competition rather than in cooperation. 6cfeea48-d1eb-43c8-bd6b-021d78d1bc75 4 Strategic AI Competition ~ President Trump has characterized artificial intelligence leadership as a contest in which the winner "is probably going to win, period." This zero-sum framing stands in tension with organizations such as WAICO, whose founding Vision emphasizes equitable access to the benefits of innovation rather than exclusive national advantage. The Objectives below are retained as competitive rather than joint because they are structurally exclusive: capability advantage sought by one government is generally intended to come at the relative expense of the other, and neither export controls nor a declared race for dominance readily accommodates the kind of shared, mutually referenced objectives that Relationship elements in StratML Part 2 are designed to express. Infrastructure Expand domestic artificial intelligence data center and computing capacity to secure national advantage. 894a3464-808e-477f-a0e6-6a21b67a68f1 4.1 Domestic AI Infrastructure ~ Both governments have pursued rapid build-out of data centers and computing capacity. On the U.S. side, this has included the initiatives referenced in Executive Order 14179 and the America's AI Action Plan (AAIAP), which frame infrastructure expansion explicitly as a competitiveness objective rather than an area for coordination with China. Export Controls Maintain or adjust export controls on semiconductors and related technologies intended to preserve relative artificial intelligence capability. 8146e8b5-75c1-426b-818b-6fac16d84bb9 4.2 Technology Export Controls ~ U.S. semiconductor export controls are intended to preserve a relative computing-capability advantage over China. Because their explicit purpose is to constrain, rather than assist, the other government's artificial intelligence development, this Objective is structurally incompatible with WAICO's Objective 3.5 (International Assistance), which envisions voluntary cooperation to help nations build artificial intelligence capability appropriate to their needs. Leadership Achieve and demonstrate national leadership in artificial intelligence capability relative to the other government. 2d0961d9-d471-4ecc-ab06-d822c8a4202b 4.3 National AI Leadership ~ Each government has published or signaled its own artificial intelligence leadership strategy, including the AAIAP and Executive Order 14179 on the U.S. side. Because leadership in this framing is comparative rather than absolute, one government's success is defined partly in terms of the other's relative position, which is the essential feature distinguishing this Objective from the joint Objectives in Goals 1 through 3. Agreements & Differences Encourage publication of clear, and where feasible machine-readable, statements of any agreements or continuing points of difference resulting from the meeting. b68bcb2c-c642-432f-bd07-06dce2fab10d 5 Post-Summit Transparency ~ A published, structured account of what was and was not agreed would let outside observers, including standards bodies and organizations such as WAICO, understand which parts of the U.S.-China artificial intelligence relationship are genuinely coordinated and which remain contested, rather than relying on inference from press statements alone. Statements Publish a joint or parallel statement summarizing any agreements reached at the meeting concerning artificial intelligence. d6993611-4055-4a6a-a60a-49a1f5533de1 5.1 Joint or Parallel Statement ~ Even where the two governments cannot agree on a single joint statement, parallel statements describing each government's own understanding of what was discussed would still provide more transparency than the current absence of any published summit agenda or outcome document. Plans Encourage future publication of any resulting agreements in a standardized, machine-readable strategic plan format such as ISO 17469 (StratML). edbed21d-23f4-4a57-9b44-91d6db76cfae 5.2 Machine-Readable Plan Publication ~ Publishing any resulting agreements in a standardized, machine-readable format such as ISO 17469 (StratML) would allow the cooperative Objectives identified in Goals 1 through 3 to be explicitly linked, through Part 2 Relationship elements, to related plans such as WAICO, NPFAI, PAIC, AAIAP, AAIE, and EO14179, making overlaps and gaps far easier to identify than through prose analysis alone. ^^ It is worthy of note that the U.S. and China were two of the five nations that originally agreed to specify StratML as an international standard. 2026-09-24 2026-09-24 2026-07-24 https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-says-chinese-president-xi-jinping-visit-us-sept-24 Owen Ambur Owen.Ambur@verizon.net